Banks and Banking -- Joint Accounts -- Rights of Survivor by Nichols, Charles E.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 31 | Number 1 Article 10
12-1-1952
Banks and Banking -- Joint Accounts -- Rights of
Survivor
Charles E. Nichols
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles E. Nichols, Banks and Banking -- Joint Accounts -- Rights of Survivor, 31 N.C. L. Rev. 95 (1952).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol31/iss1/10
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Banks and Banking-Joint Accounts-Rights of Survivor
A deposited money in a building and loan association. After his
marriage to B they went to the Association and had the ledger sheet
and passbook changed to read "'A, or wife, B." When A died intestate,
C, his son by a previous marriage, brought suit against B claiming that
the deposit belonged to the estate and not to B as survivor. The North
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment for C
by holding that when A deposits money in an account in the name of
A or B, in the absence of rebutting testimony of an agreement or a gift,
it merely creates an agency in B to withdraw such funds and upon A's
death the agency terminates and the funds become a part of A's estate.1
The case affirms previous -North Carolina cases. 2 What is interesting,
however, is the fact that when A and B changed the account they also
signed a signature card purporting to be a subscription for optional
savings shares for A or B, to be held as joint tenants with right of sur-
vivorship. Because B had failed to serve a case on appeal, the Supreme
Court stated that it would consider only exceptions presented by the
record proper and accordingly considered the exceptions addressed to
the conclusions of law made by the trial judge on the facts as found by
him. Thus the lower court's finding of fact that the signature card was
not executed for the purpose of transferring the old account to a joint
account with survivorship rights was held to be conclusive.3
This case still leaves open in North Carolina the question concern-
ing the rights of a survivor to an account opened by A with his own
'Hall v. Hall, 235 N. C. 711, 71 S. E. 2d 471 (1952). While other courts do
not apply the agency principle to a similar situation, the same result is reached.
Packard v. Foster, 95 N. H. 47, 56 N. E. 2d 925 (1948) ; Philleppser v. Emigrant
Industrial Say. Bank, 274 App. Div. 1026, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
In some states an account opened by a husband in the name of husband or wife
creates a tendancy by the entireties. Hoyle v. Hoyle, 66 A. 2d 130 (Del. Ch.
1949) ; State Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Coleman, 240 S. W. 2d 188 (Mo. 1951) ;
Alcom v. Alcom, 364 Pa. 375, 72 A. 2d 96 (1950); Sloan v. Jones, 192 Tenn.
400, 241 S. W. 2d 506 (1951).
There is no tenancy by the entireties in personal property in North Carolina.
Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923).
'Redmond v. Farthing, 217 N. C. 678, 9 S. E. 2d 405 (1940); Nannie v.
Pollard, 20S N. C. 362, 171 S. E. 341 (1933) ; Jones v. Fullbright, 197 N. C. 274,
148 S. E. 229 (1929) (certificate of deposit), noted in 8 N. C. L. Rsv. 73 (1929).
'The lower court found that the card was only for subscription of shares
which were not issued. An official of the Home Building and Loan states that
the card was a signing in respect to the existing account and that the term
"Optional Savings Shares" referred to the savings account. The actual shares
of the Building and Loan available for subscription are called "Full Paid Income
Shares." Recently the Home Building and Loan changed the paine "Optional
Savings Shares" to "Savings Account."
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money in the name of A or B, payable to either or to the survivor,4 and,
incidentally, the rights of A and B during the lives of both. Because
survivorship as an incident to joint tenancy is abolished in North Caro-
lina,5 the right to survivorship of a joint bank account must be founded
on some other grounds.
The rights of A or B as a survivor to a joint account have been
based on five theories: (1) trust, (2) joint tenancy, (3) statutory pre-
sumption of survivorship rights, (4) gift, and (5) contract.
(1) and (2) appear to be theories of the past.0 The lack of a trust
intent and of a trust res renders the trust theory inappropriate, 7 and
the creation of a survivorship account does not meet the requirements
of the common law unities necessary for joint tenancy.8
'This is the scope of this note. The litigation usually arises in respect to
the rights of A's estate against the rights of B as a survivor for the balance of
the joint account. Thus A's personal representative tries to obtain all the balance
and B does likewise. There is a noticeable absence of cases where both A and B
have deposited money in the joint account. It can only be surmised that the reason
for this is that a personal representative of A will only bring an action against
B when he knows that all the money in a survivorship account was deposited by
A. Clearly B could show consideration from both himself and A in. creating
a contractual right in the survivor when he too has contributed to the account.
See Berrerick v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297, 28 N. E. 2d 636 (1940).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §41-2 (1943, Recompiled 1950) ; Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N. C.
396, 42 S. E. 2d 468 (1947). Survivorship in personal property may be provided
for by contract. Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 571, 21 S. E. 202 (1895). The above
statute abolishes the right of survivorship to real property in joint tenancies in
estates of inheritance but does not affect joint estates for life and estates by
entirety in such property. Burton v. Cahill, 192 N. C. 506, 135 S. E. 332 (1926).
Other States have similar statutes: ALA. CODE ANN. tit 47 § 19 (1940) ; ARIZ.
CODE ANN. § 39-110 (1939) ; CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7096 (1949) (survivorship as
incident to joint tenancy is good if instrument calls for survivorship) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 689.15 (1941) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1002 (1935) (same as Connecticut,
supra) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-104 (Burns 1951) (same as Connecticut, snpra) ;
ORE. CouP. LAWS ANN. § 70-205 (1940); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 431 § 2 (1938)
(same as Connecticut, supra); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 7604 (Williams 1934); VA.
CoDE § 55-20 (1950) (§ 55-21 same as Connecticut, .upra).
' No case based on either of these theories has been found from an examina-
tion of cases decided in the past seven years where the formula was merely A
or B or the survivor. However, compare Hancock v. Savings Bank of Baltimore,
85 A. 2d 770 (Md. 1952) (A in trust for A or B payable to either or the survivor).
This seems to be the standard form for joint accounts in mutual savings banks in
Baltimore.
Joint tenancy as spoken of here is the common law tenancy which is created
by law and is not to be confused with a statutory joint tenancy as discussed at
page 98. See notes 8 and 14, infra.
For cases based on these two theories see 7 Am. Jun., Banks §§ 434, 435 (1937).
See Havighurst, Gifts of Bank Deposits, 14 N. C. L. Rnv. 129, 146 where
the following observation is made and supported by authority: "A more unusual
theory is that of a trust. Some of the cases announcing this doctrine fail to
indicate the mechanics of the application; what is the res and who is the trustee?
It must be that either the depositor, still the owner of the chose in action, in
this manner declares himself trustee for the claimant, or the bank is the trustee.
It has been pointed out that in any case this is a strained application. The bank
as debtor cannot be trustee and in any event the intent to create a trust is hard
io find." 8 N. C. L.* REv. 73 (1926).
See also 1 Scor, TRusTs § 58.6 (3) (1939) ; 1 BoamT, TtuSTS § 47 (1935).
'Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 68 A. 2d 241 (1949); 16 WASH. L. REV.
105, 109; 48 C. J. S., Joint Tenancy § 3 c. (4).
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The statutory presumption theory, (3.-),, stems from banking legisla-
tion. ,Today, when A makes a deposit for a joint checking or savings
account, most banks. furnish him with a signature card which must
be signed by both parties. These cards expressly provide that the de-
posit shall be payable to either or to the survivor. This is done pur-
suant to a banking statute which relieves the bank of liability to either
of the parties or to their legal representatives on paying either or, the
survivor.0 All forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
such a statute. Thirty-six of these do not expressly relate to the rights
of the parties or the survivor 0 but at least four of these by judicial
interpretation create a presumption that the money is the property of
the survivor. 1
The statutes of thirteen states go further by expressly creating
property rights in the joint account. 1 2  Eight of these thirteen statutes
N . C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146 (1943, Recompiled 1950). "When a deposit, has
been or is hereafter made in any bank, trust company, banking and trust company,
or any other institution transacting business in this State, in the names of two
persons, payable to either, or payable to either or the survivor, all or any part
of the deposit, or any interest or dividend thereon, may be paid to either of said
persons, whether the other is living or not; and the receipt or acquittance of the
person so paid is a valid and sufficient discharge to the bank for payment so made."
Discussed in 9 N. C. L. REv. 14 (1930).
Even with the above statute, the bank cannot allow the survivor of a joint
account to withdraw the balance without retaining a sufficient portion to pay
inheritance taxes or interest which would thereafter be assessed under the tax
law; and if the account was in the name of husband or wife, twenty per cent
must be retained. Failure of the bank to comply with the provision, except under
certain stated exceptions, renders it liable for the amount of the taxes and interest.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-25 (1943, Recompiled 1950).1oARiz. CODE ANN. § 51-516 (1939); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5831 (1949); DEL.
REv. CODE § 2270 (1935) ; D. C. CODE § 26-201 (1940) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 653.16
(Cum. Supp. 1951); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2039 (1935); IDAHo CODE § 26-1014
(1947); I i.. ANN. STAT. c. 76 § 2 (Cum. Supp. 1951); IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-
2001 (Burns 1951) ; IowA CODE § 528.64 (1946) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9.1205
(1949); KY REv. STAT. § 140.250 (1948); LA. REV. STAT. § 6-32 (1950); MD.
ANN CODE GEN. LAws art. 11 § 102 (1939) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 167 § 14 (Cum.
Supp. 1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.30 (West 1945); MIss. CODE ANN. § 5205
(Cum. Supp. 1950); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 5-528 (1947); Nm. REV. STAT.§ 8-167 (1943); NEV. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 473 (1929); N. H. REv. LAWS c.
309 § 20 (1942); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 50-1003/ (1941); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 53-
146 (1943, Recompiled 1950); N. D. REv. CODE § 6-0366 (1943); OHIO GEN.
CODE ANN. § 710-120 (1938); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6 § 1180 (Cum. Supp.
1949); ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 40-1003 (1940); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 §819-
903 (Cum. Supp. 1951); R. I. GEN. LAwS c. 135 § 3 (1938); S. C. CODE ANN.
§ 7851 (1942) ; S. D. CODE § 6.0414 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 5935.1 (Wil-
liams Cum. Supp. 1952) ; TEX. STAT., REv. Civ. art. 342-710 (1947) ; U TAH CODE
ANN. § 7-3-47 (1943) ; VA. CODE § 6-55 (1950) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 35-
148 (1945).
" lit re McIlrath, 276 Ill. App. 408 (1934) (prima facie contract rebuttable
by showing no intention to contract) ; Cashman v. Mason, 166 F. 2d 693 (8th Cir.
1948) (Minn.; rebuttable presumption that it is a gift of a joint interest);
Leverette v. Aimsworth, 199 Miss. 652, 23 So. 2d 798 (1945) (rebuttable by proof
of no intent to create joint ownership); Parkening v. Haffke, 157 Neb. 678,
46 N. W. 2d 117 (1951) (survivor takes unless terms of .the account are to the
contrary).
" ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 128 (2) (Supp. 1951); Ann. STAT. ANN. § 67-
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provide a conclusive presumption that the owner intended to vest title
in the survivor.' 3 Ten of the thirteen create a statutory joint tenancy.14
Even where there is a conclusive presumption of ownership in the sur-
vivor,' 5 the fact of joint tenancy is rebuttable during the lives of the
joint tenants;16 and in some of the jurisdictions creating joint tenan-
cies and conclusive survivorship rights,17 the fact of joint tenancy is
rebuttable as to any money withdrawn by the survivor during the de-
ceased's life.' s
It is in those states whose statutes create a conclusive property right
in the survivor that the statute plays the dominant role in the cases.
Where the statute states no property right, or such right is expressed
but rebuttable, then the survivor must then depend on one of the other
theories to recover.
521 (1947); CAL. BANKING CODE § 852 (1949); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 18 § 45
(1935); ME. Rxv. STAT. 55 § 36 (1944); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 23.303 (Moore
1943) ; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7996 (1939) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-218 (1950) ;
N. Y. BANxING LAW § 134 sub. 3; VT. STAT. REv. §§ 8779, 8780 (1947) ; WAsH.
REv. CODE § 30.20.010, 30.20.015 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3205 (1949);
Wis. STAT. §§ 221.45, 222.12(9) (1951).(1) Alabama. No survivorship case found.(2) Arkansas. Pye v. Higgason, 210 Ark. 347, 195 S. W. 2d 632 (1946).
(3) Colorado. Houle v. McMillan, 83 Colo. 216, 263 Pac. 409 (1928). An
expressed contract may be proved which is contrary to the signature card. Ur-
bancich v. Jersin, 123 Colo. 88, 226 P. 2d 316 (1950).
(4) Maine. Presumption applies only to accounts in name of husband or
wife, or in name of parent or child up to $5000.
(5) New York. It may be proved that deceased depositor was incompetent
at the time of making the deposit to rebut the presumption. Application of
Hayes, 279 App. Div. 823, 109 N. Y. S. 2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1952). This conclusive
presumption applies only when the money was deposited in a savings bank and
does not apply when made in a commercial bank. In re Duke's Will, 108 N. Y. S.
2d 875 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1951). See also WAsr. REv. CODE. § 30.20.010 (1950).
(6) Vermont. Stroh v. Duman, 84 A. 2d 408 (Vt. 1951).
(7) .Washington. In re Iver's Estate, 4 Wash. 2d 477, 104 P. 2d 467 (1940).
(8) Wisconsin. The right of the survivor is by virtue of a contract.
Schwanke v. Gavit, 219 Wis. 367, 263 N. W. 176 (1935).
California, prior to the 1949 Banking Code (note 12 supra), had a statute
which provided for a conclusive presumption as in the above states. CAL. GEN.
LAws act 625 § 15a (1937). Jorgenson v. Dalstrom, 53 Cal. App. 2d 322, 127
P. 2d 551 (1942). Under this old act it could be proved that the survivor was
to hold funds in trust for another. Jarkich v. Badagliacco, 75 Cal. App. 2d 505,
170 P. 2d 994 (1946). Also where a confidential relationship could be shown
between the survivor and the deceased depositor, a presumption of fraud and undue
influence arose. Sodon v. Lichtenstein, 244 P. 2d 907 (Cal. 1952). No case could
be found interpreting the 1949 statute.
1 Arkansas, California, Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The Vermont statute, note 12 supra, states
that an "absolute joint account" is created.
' See note 13 supra.
Cash v. Cash, 243 P. 2d 115 (Cal. 1952); Stark v. Central Savings Bank,
93 N. Y. S. 2d 805 (Sup. Ct 1949).
'" Compare notes 13 and 14 supra.
8 Paterson v. Comastre, 244 P. 2d 902 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1952) ; Morrow v. Mos-
kowitz, 255 N. Y. 219, 174 N. E. 460 (1921) (Survivor may take the balance
but if he withdrew money during the life of deceased he may have to pay this
amount to the estate if it is proved A had no intention to create joint ownership
in the account) ; Munson v. Haye, 29 Wash. 2d 733, 189 P. 2d 464 (1948).
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A survivor who must base his recovery upon the gift theory, (4),
runs into technical difficulties. The basic elements of a gift inter vivos
must be proved-donative intent' 9 and delivery.2  Control over the
passbook by A may prevent the survivor from taking the balance.2 '
Some of the courts realize that only one person can have a passbook
at a time22 and that the actual subject of the gift-money on deposit-
cannot be manually delivered.2 3  As a result, some courts have stream-
lined the gift theory by saying that the signing of the signature card by
both parties is prima facie evidence of a gift.24  Another traditional
problem, however, may face the survivor and upset his prima facie case.
A showing of a confidential relationship raises a presumption of fraud.25
The beauty of theory (5), contract, is that it does not have to depend
upon a statute or the interpretation thereof, upon technical require-
ments such as those relative to gifts, 26 or upon inappropriate property
law as concerns the unities of joint tenancies.2 7 For these reasons,
this theory is being accepted by a growing number of state courts.
28
The contract is found in the words on the signature card. The theory
is well expressed in Hill v. Havens where A changed his bank ac-
"Olive v. Olive, 231 S. W. 2d 480 (Tex. 1950). Cf. Bulen v. Pendleton
Banking Co., 118 Ind. App. 217, 78 N. E. 2d 449 (1948). (Delivery of passbook
to checking account is not sufficient to sustain a gift since the depositor does not
thereby lose control over the deposit.).
20 Ogle v. Barber, 224 Ind. 489, 68 N. E. 2d 550 (1946). For a discussion of
all types of bank account gifts see Havighurst, Gifts of Bank Deposits, 14 N. C.
L. REv. 129 (1936).
"1 Packard v. Foster, 95 N. H. 47, 56 A. 2d 925 (1948).
22In re Fells Estate, 369 Pa. 597, 599, 87 A. 2d 310, 312 (1952).
"State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 16, 195 P. 2d 989, 993
(1948) (stated that the actual gift is not money but the co-equal right with
donor to exercise control over the deposit).
2, Drain v. Brookline Savings Bank, 99 N. E. 2d 160 (Mass. 1951). Link
v. Link, 65 A. 2d 89 (N. J. Ch. 1949). In re Fell's Estate, 369 Pa. 597, 87 A. 2d
310 (1952).
2 Nicholson v. Shockey, 102 Va. 270, 64 S. E. 2d 813 (1951).
2 Cuilini v. Northern Trust Co., 335 Il. App. 86, 90, 80 N. E. 2d 275, 277
(1948).
"'it re Wilson's Estate, 336 Ill. App. 18, 35, 82 N. E. 2d 684, 691 (1948).
Nor is there any worry concerning the statute of wills. See Chippendale v.
North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371 (1916). The contract
creates a present vested interest. In re Kessler's estate, 240 Ohio App. 85, 85
N. E. 2d 609 (1949).
28 Crabtree v. Garcia, 43 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1949); Guest v. Stone, 206 Ga.
239, 56 S. E. 2d 247 (1949). (The Georgia court did not allow the survivor to
take because a statute allowing a third party beneficiary a remedy was not enacted
until after the making of this particular contract) ; In. re Wilson's Estate, 336 Ill.
App. 18, 82 N. E. 2d 684 (1948); Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N. W. 2d
870 (1951) ; It re Fast's Estate, 169 Kan. 238, 218 P. 2d 184 (1950) ; Chippen-
dale v. North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371 (1916) ; Park
Enterprises v. Trask, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N. W. 2d 194 (1951) ; Gladieux v. Parney,
106 N. E. 2d 317 (Ohio 1951); Langoe v. Gianniki, 186 Ore. 207, 206 P. 2d 106
(1949).
For notes supporting the theory see: 17 U. CiN. L. Rxv. 402 (1948) ; 38 HARV.
L. Ra,. 243 (1924) ; 32 ILL. L. Rtv. 57, 70 (1937); 8 N. C. L. REy. 73 (1929).2 242 Iowa 920, 43 N. W. 2d 870 (1951).
1952]
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count to A or B, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. In that
case the Iowa court said: "It is now the settled law in Iowa that when
a definite written agreement . .. is made by a depository bank with
its customers . . . such agreement is binding upon the bank and the
parties signatory.... The contract is that the bank will, in considera-
tion of the funds with it and the creation of a debtor-creditor relation
between itself and its depositor, consider them as owners in joint ten-
ancy . . . and that upon the death of either depositor any balance in
the account shall become the absolute property of the survivor."a0 The
survivor's contractual right is that of a third party beneficiary"' or a
donee-survivor.32 When the contract is complete, stating that the
balance shall be the property of the survivor, parol evidence as to the
intention of A in creating the account will not be admissible unless there
is an allegation of fraud, deceit, duress, or mistake.as When both
parties are living, the form of the deposit is not conclusive and parol
evidence of the intention of the parties is admissible because there is
no question of survivorship rights.8 4
This leads to the incidental point concerning the rights of A and B
in dealing with the survivorship account while both are living. Where
the property rights of A and B are determined under statutes creating
joint tenancies, there is a rebuttable presumption that each should get
one-half; however, A may show that there was another agreement con-
cerning the funds35 or that all the money in the account was his prop-
erty. 6 Litigation between A and B under the gift theory would depend
30 Id. at 929, 48 N. W. 2d at 876. Note particularly the court's construction of
the joint tenancy contract that the bank will consider the depositors as owners
in joint tenancy. Query: Does this actually make A and B joint tenants with
respect to themselves or to creditors or other third parties during the lives of
A and B under the contract theory? A and B may not have contracted between
themselves for a joint tenancy. This would tend to support the theory of the
cases in note 34, infra, that during the lives of the parties, parol evidence is admis-
sible as to the rights of parties or their existing creditors to show the realities
of ownership.
81 Rhorbacker v. Citizens Bldg. Ass'n Co., 138 Ohio St. 273, 276, 34 N. E.
2d 751, 753 (1941).
82 This name for the survivor was invented in Matthew v. Moncrief, 135 F.
2d 645 (D. C. Cir. 1943).
" Matthew v. Moncrief, 135 F. 2d 645 (D. C. Cir. 1943) ; Cuilini v. Northern
Trust Co., 335 Ill. App. 86, 80 N. E. 2d 275 (1948); Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa
920, 48 N. W. 2d 870 (1951).3" Harrington v. Emmerman, 186 F. 2d 757 (D. C. Cir. 1950); Union Prop-
erties, Inc. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 152 Ohio St. 430, 89 N. E. 2d 638 (1949).
Logically, this seems unsound. If the contract calls for joint ownership with sur-
vivorship rights, why should parol evidence as to the intent of A in creating
the account be excluded when the rights of a survivor are in question but allowed
when determining the rights between A and B during their lives?
"Wallace v. Riley, 23 Cal. App. 654, 74 P. 2d 807 (1937) (that if A should
recover from an illness, B would transfer his interest in the funds back to A on
request).
." Stark v, Central Savings Bank, 93 N. Y, S. 2d 805 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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upon B's ability to prove a gift of a joint interest in the account. If
proved, B would get one-half ;37 if not, A would be entitled to the whole
amount. When the rights of A and B are determined, during their
lives, by a court which uses the contract theory in survivorship cases,
it would seem that each party should take one-half if the agreement
speaks of them as co-owners or joint tenants. But it has been held that
the ownership is determined by the person who places the funds in
the account.38
As a practical matter, the ability of A or B to withdraw funds de-
posited by A in a joint account during the lives of both depends upon
who is in possesion of the passbook.3 9 To determine the right of A or B
to withdraw from the account, the nature of the account must be de-
termined. Obviously, if no present rights are found in B, he would
have no withdrawal rights. Assuming that B does have an inter vivos
right to the account, this right may be interpreted in several different
ways. When either'party draws out the total amount, one result is that
the joint ownership is traceable to any new account ir which the sum
withdrawn is deposited, and if the withdrawer predeceases the other,
the latter takes the whole amount as survivor.40 Another result of a
total withdrawal is that it severs the joint ownership and the with-
drawer is responsible to the other for one-half.41 A third solution
is that each party bears the risk that the other will withdraw the whole
amount; and when this is done, it will destroy the interest of the
other.42 Where more than one-half but less than the total amount
is withdrawn, it has been held that the money retains its joint charac-
ter ;43 but where less than one-half was withdrawn, there is no such
joint right.44
37Goc v. Goc, 134 N. J. Eq. 61, 33 A. 2d 870 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943).8 Ulmer v. Society for Savings, 35 Ohio App. 525, 41 N. E. 2d 578 (1942).
"Of course if it were a checking account, either party could write a check
for the whole amount. This would not necessarily mean that the whole amount
would be treated as the property of such withdrawer. See cases in notes 40 and
41 in !ra. No distinction is made by the courts between savings accounts and
checking accounts in themselves; but as pointed out in note 19, supra, a delivery
of a checking account passbook does not meet the delivery requirement of the
gift theory.
40 State v. Gralewski's Estate, 176 Ore. 448, 159 P. 2d 211 (1945) (with-
drawal made with manifest intention of defeating the co-owner's right). See
26 ORE. L. REV. 114 (1947).
"Clausen v. Warner, 118 Ind. App. 340, 78 N. E. 2d 551 (1948); Goe v.
Goc, 134 N. J. Eq. 61, 33 A. 2d 870 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943).
4" McLaughlin v. Cooper's Estate, 128 Conn. 557, 561, 24 A. 2d 502, 504 (1942).
This is based on the fact that the deposit agreement states "payable to either".
" Nusshold v. Kruschke, 176 Ore. 610, 159 P. 2d 819 (1945).
" In re Suter's Estate, 258 N. Y. 104, 179 N. E. 310 (1932). The court said
at page 310: "Joint ownership of a bank deposit does not differ from any other
joint ownership. Nothing in the Banking laws prevents one joint owner from
destroying the joint ownership in the entire deposit to the extent of his with-
drawals of no more than his equal share for his own use. .. ."
1952]
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The pros and cons and the differences between the above theories
are not just academic in respect to North Carolina law on the sub-
ject. We have no authority on the rights of a survivor to a joint bank
account made payable to the survivor. 45 Justice Barnhill, however, in
the principal case furnished a lead when he said :46 "It may be that
in fact the account existing at the time Hall and wife visited the office
of the Building and Loan Association was the subject of the agreement
(italics added) evidenced by . . . [the signature card stating a right
of survivorship] . . . and that the fente 'defendant has a valid claim
to the balance remaining in the account at the time of the death of her
intestate. If so, she has failed to bring up the evidence so as to enable
us to review the findings of the judge in the light of all the testimony."
Justice Barnhill does not mention whether the agreement should be
between A and B or whether it could be between A and the bank for
the benefit of A and B. There is North Carolina authority to the effect
that survivorship may be the subject of a valid contract, 47 regardless
of the fact that survivorship is abolished as an incident of joint tenan-
cy.48  Also North Carolina has recognized third party beneficiary con-
tracts.0 There seems to be no reason why the North Carolina court
For creditor's rights against money in a joint bank account see: Park Enter-
prises v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N. W. 2d 194 (1951) ; Sitomer v. North River
Sav. Bank, 196 Misc. 870, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 402 (N. Y. City Ct. 1949); Union
Properties, Inc. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 152 Ohio St. 430, 89 N. E. 2d 638
(1949).
For death and gift tax aspect of joint bank accounts see: Petition of Hanson,
232 P. 2d 342 (Mont. 1951) ; In re Perier, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P. 2d 989 (1948) ;
In re Comb's Estate, 90 N. E. 2d 440 (Ohio 1949) ; In re Kleinschmidt's Estate,
362 Pa. 353, 67 A. 2d 117 (1949) ; SHArrOcx, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK
§§ 41, 42, 43 (1948); CCH INHERiTANcE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERvicE-N. C.
STATE TAX 1570 (7th ed. 1944); Op's. N. C. Atty. Gen., CCH INHERITANCE,
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REPORTER 111 7, 148; 17, 636 (7th ed. State Current 1950).
"In Hairston v. Glenn, 120 N. C. 341, 27 S. E. 32 (1897) there was litiga-
tion over a survivorship account but the court said that the question of sur-
vivorship was not before them because the survivor only claimed one-half of
the balance.
In a case litigated over the right to shares made out jointly with right of
survivorship, the survivor was not allowed to take the entire amount because
of failure to prove a gift inter vivos from the deceased. Buffalo v. Barnes, 226
N. C. 313, 38 S. E. 2d 222 (1946). A dissent by Justice Barnhill raised the
question concerning joint tenancy created by contract. For an analysis of this
case see 25 N. C. L. REv. 91 (1946).
,Hall v. Hall, 235 N. C. 711, 716, 71 S. E. 2d 471, 474 (1952).
Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N. C. 178, 7 N. E. 2d 366 (1940) ; Taylor v. Smith,
116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1895).
"See note 5 supra.
"Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N. C. 190, 56 S. E. 2d 566 (1949). This case
cites practically all the North Carolina cases dealing with these contracts. These
cases recognize the right of a third party to sue when a contract is made for
his benefit. If the bank paid the money into the estate, the survivor could bring
an action for it. If the bank paid the survivor and an action was brought by the
personal representative of the deceased against the survivor, the court could




would not allow the survivor to take the balance as in Hill v. Havens,
supra, whether the contract be for joint ownership with right of sur-
vivorship or whether it be for payment to either or to the survivor. 50
There is a need today for a definite rule by which a person may
deposit money in a bank with the assurance that he can make use of
the money during his life and that upon his death his wife or some
,designated person may have funds to live on without waiting for the
administration of his estate. A recognition of the contract theory
could assure this. If this theory is not followed, then legislation should
be passed to make a conclusive right in the survivor.
CHARLES E. NICHOLS.
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Motion Pictures
"Expression by means of motion pictures is included within the
free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments."' Thus the Supreme Court of the United States, in a recent
unanimous decision, overturned the thirty-seven year old precedent of
Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,2 and paved
the way for a substantial judicial rewriting of the law relating to the
official censorship of motion pictures, a practice currently authorized
by statute in eight states,3 and by ordinance in perhaps 75 cities.4
The motion picture, from its early years a cause of concern to
municipal officials fearful of its potential for evil,5 was first subjected to
" Most North Carolina banks use only the words "payable to either or to the
survivor." The Home Building and Loan Association, in addition to this, uses
the joint tenancy feature. If the contract theory were followed, the survivor's
rights would be the same in either case; but if a dispute developed between A and
B over the account, B's chances would seem to be much better if joint tenancy
or joint ownership words were used. See notes 30 and 34, supra. For suggestions
in drafting joint account signature cards see: 1 PATON'S DIGEST; LEGAL OPINIONS
AND BANKING LAW §§ 1810, 1811 (1926).
1 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 781 (1952).
-236 U. S. 230 (1915), affirning 215 Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio 1914).
'Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia. For current statute citations, see note 14, infra.
'Kupferman and O'Brien, Motion Picture Censorship-The Memphis Blues,
36 CORNELL L. Q. 273, 276 n. 24 (1951) ; Note, 39 COL. L. Rav. 1383, 1385 n. 17
(1939). For a comprehensive view of the development and operation of legal
film censorship see INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES (1947); CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 540-548 (1941) ; ERNST AND LORENTz, CENSORED:
THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE MOVIES (1930) ; Note, 64 A. L. R. 505 (1930) ; Notes,
39 COL. L. REV. 1383 (1939), 60 YALE L. J. 696 (1951) ; Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 87(1939).
'Motion pictures were invented by Edison in 1889, and first publicly exhibited
in 1894. INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES 75 (1947). In 1909 New York banned
children under 16 from commercial movie theaters unless accompanied by a
parent or guardian. 1 N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 278. That provision remains a part
of the New York law. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 484 (1).
The circumstances under which films are normally shown-the darkened
theater, the freedom from outside distraction, the brightly lighted screen-all
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